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Yemen and the Houthi Rebellion in the Context of the 
Global War on Terror 
 
By Tomi Pulkkinen 
 
 
Abstract: The group Ansar Allah, commonly known as the Houthis, 
took over the Yemeni capital Sana’a in the Fall of 2014, and have 
been engaged in a conflict with the exiled government President 
Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and a Saudi-led coalition of mostly 
Arab countries since March 2015. The Houthis originate from the 
north-western region of Saada, and represent a faction of Yemen's 
Zaydi minority, but neither the group nor the conflict in Yemen are 
primarily sectarian. The situation in Yemen is complicated by 
various regional, political, and tribal factions that form alliances 
of convenience for political purposes. The situation is further 
complicated by the U.S. led War on Terror and its local variations, 
and the Houthis, a socio-political movement, is a sworn enemy of 
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula which has been the target of 
U.S. and Yemeni counter-terrorism efforts in the country. This 
paper seeks to shed light on the origins and nature of the Houthi 
movement as well as the realities of the War on Terror in Yemen 





Houthi fighters took over the Yemeni capital Sana’a and much of 
northwestern Yemen in September 2014, in the midst of 
demonstrations against the ruling Hadi regime,1 as the moral 
guidance department of the Yemeni armed forces threw its support 
behind the “people’s revolution,”2 leaving the capital city 
unprotected. Meanwhile, President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and 
his allies proved incapable of containing the growing crisis. Houthi 
                                                 
1 Ian Black, “Yemen: Understanding Houthi Motives is Complicated but 
Essential,” The Guardian, January 19, 2015, accessed December 10, 2015,  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/19/understanding-houthi-motives-
complicated-essential-yemen-future. 
2 26 September Net, “منتسبوا التوجيه المعنوي يعلنون تأييدهم لثورة الشعب” September 21, 
2014, accessed March 24, 2017, http://www.26sep.net/news_details.php?sid= 
107024. 
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forces subsequently seized the critical southern port of Aden as 
well, though they later lost it to pro-government forces in July 
2015.3 According to the United Nations, the Houthis have agreed 
to a resolution to stop fighting, but a Saudi led coalition of Gulf 
and Arab countries has continued its bombing of Yemen, which 
has caused enormous loss of life in the region, including an 
unacceptable number of civilian casualties.4 The conflict between 
the Houthis and the government in Yemen has been ongoing for 
more than ten years, but there is no end in sight to the fighting that 
has devastated the country that ranks among the poorest in the 
world. The Houthis enjoy widespread popular support and 
continue to control large swaths of territory in western Yemen, 
despite the fact that the movement originated among the Zaydi 
religious minority from the northern provinces. April Longley 
Alley5 has observed that: 
 
supporters of the movement see the Houthis as 
correcting the wrongs of the country’s 2011 
transition agreement, which preserved the power and 
corruption of old regime elites. They praise the 
movement’s willingness to confront corruption, 
combat al-Qa‘ida, and fill a security vacuum left by 
a feckless government.6 
 
 Despite their overtly anti-American and anti-Israeli 
rhetoric, the Houthi movement is a sworn enemy of al-Qaeda and 
other extremist Sunni groups in Yemen. Its operations are 
restricted to Yemen, as opposed to international terrorist groups 
that seek to extend the theater of war to other countries, 
                                                 
3 “Yemen's Houthis 'pushed from last Aden stronghold,’”Al-Jazeera, July 23, 
2015, accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/ 
yemen-houthis-pushed-aden-stronghold-150723002942312.html. 
4 Associated Press in Sana’a, “Second Yemen Wedding Bombed as UN Says 
Houthi Rebels Accept Ceasefire,” The Guardian, October 7, 2015, accessed 
December 10, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/08/second-
yemen-wedding-bombed-as-un-says-houthi-rebels-accept-ceasefire. 
5 April Longley Alley is a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group, who 
has “conducted fieldwork in Yemen since 2004.” “April Longley-Alley,” 
International Crisis Group, accessed March 24, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup. 
org/who-we-are/people/april-longley-alley. 
6 April Longley Alley, “Yemen’s Houthi Takeover,” Middle East Institute, 






particularly in the West. In order to see past the inflammatory 
slogans of the Houthi movement and to understand the nature of 
the group and its success in controlling territory in Yemen, one 
must consider various phenomena; such as the history of Yemen as 
a country, its social structure, the nature and roots of Zaydism, the 
origins of the Houthi movement, the concept of the Global War on 
Terror, the involvement of the United States in Yemen and in the 
Middle East in general, as well as the domestic politics of Yemen. 
The Houthi movement has not been designated as a terrorist 
organization by the United States, and it may, in fact, be a potential 
ally in the fight against al-Qaeda as it has vowed to destroy the 
group.7 This may sound counterintuitive but the dearth of effective 
local allies, as well as the complex political and tribal environment 
of Yemen makes for strange alliances. Given the popularity of the 
group in parts of Yemen and its leadership role in the fight against 
an unresponsive and oppressive regime, as well as the local 
resistance to foreign interference in Yemeni politics, the prospect 
of defeating it by providing weapons and material support to the 
exiled president Hadi and the Saudi led coalition seems unlikely. 
The Saudi government’s ideological opposition to the Zaydis is 
intimately connected to politics in the Arabian Peninsula, as the 
Zaydi religious ideology challenges the legitimacy of the al-Saud 
family. Zaydi presence and control of territory in northern Yemen, 
however, has roots that reach to a time thousand years before the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia - roots that are essential to 





The Zaydi Shia presence in Yemen dates back to at least the late 
ninth century CE. A Zaydi Imamate independent of the Abbasid 
caliphate in Baghdad was founded in Yemen as early as 893 CE, 
and it ruled over territory of varying size in northern Yemen until 
1962.8 The first Zaydi state in the region was founded by an 
Islamic scholar and a descendant of Prophet Muhammad by the 
                                                 
7 Khalil Harb, “Ansar Allah Vows to Defeat Al-Qaeda in Yemen,” Al-Monitor, 
October 22, 2014, accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/10/yemen-ansar-allah-clashes-al-qaeda.html#.  
8 Ira M. Lapidus, Islamic Societies to the Nineteenth Century: A Global History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 487. 
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name of Yahya ibn Husayn (d. 911 CE). According to his 
biography, Yahya was invited to mediate between warring tribes of 
the Sa’ada region in the rugged highlands of northern Yemen. 
After settling the dispute between local tribes, Yahya proclaimed 
himself to be the imam (leader) of the Zaydi community, and 
adopted the honorific title al-Hadi ila al-Haqq (the guide to the 
truth) as their spiritual leader and head of state. With the military 
support of allied tribes, Yahya defeated other tribes in the area who 
opposed him, and established the rule of a Zaydi dawlah (state).9 
The Ottoman Empire, which occupied southern Yemen from 1539 
to 1636, was expelled from the area by the Qasimi branch of the 
Zaydi dynasty, but it re-established its suzerainty over Yemen in 
the nineteenth century. Ottoman suzerainty over Yemen was 
confirmed in 1911, by a treaty that granted administrative control 
of the highlands to the Zaydi imam and the control of the coastal 
areas to the Ottomans.10 In 1839, the delicate political balance in 
Yemen was complicated further by British occupation of the 
critical southern port of Aden, which was formally made a crown 
colony in 1937.11 The control of different parts of the area by the 
British and the Ottomans ultimately resulted in the division of the 
country into North and South Yemen. 
After the First World War, as the defeated Ottoman forces 
withdrew from northern Yemen, the area controlled by the Zaydi 
imamate was expanded by Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din (r. 1904 - 
1948). The imamate would rule northern Yemen until 1962, when 
a revolution resulted in the overthrow of the imam and the new 
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was established. A civil war ensued, 
between Egyptian-backed republican forces and pro-imamate 
royalists backed by Saudi Arabia. The civil war in northern Yemen 
concluded in 1967, and the rival republican and royalist factions 
were subsequently reconciled. That same year, the British were 
driven out from the south of the country and the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), a Marxist regime, was 
established there with its capital in Aden.12 The YAR (North 
Yemen) and the PDRY (South Yemen) were unified in 1990, and 
                                                 
9 Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 229. 
10 Lapidus, Islamic Societies, 487. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Mark Gasiorowski, David E. Long, and Bernard Reich, Government and 






the Republic of Yemen (ROY) was formed. President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, who had ruled the north with his General People’s Congress 
(GPC) party, became the president of unified Yemen and Sana’a 
became its capital. The secretary-general of the Yemeni Socialist 
Party (YSP) Ali Salim al-Baydh became the vice president, and the 
parliaments of the north and south were merged into a new 
parliamentary body called the Council of Deputies. The moderate 
Islamist Islah party was established by tribal shaykhs (elders) 
opposed to the YSP, and the leader of Islah, Shaykh Abdullah ibn 
Hussayn al-Ahmar, became the speaker of the new parliament.13 
In 1994, a War of Secession erupted, which pitted the 
southern forces of the YSP against the forces of president Saleh 
and some militant Islamists, among them Afghani Arabs, who 
returned home to Yemen from Afghanistan after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. That same year, Saleh was reelected as president and 
a southern general named Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi became the 
vice president. Saleh was reelected as president again in 1999.14 




Social Structure in Yemen 
 
Yemeni society is tribal in nature and kinship groups play an 
important role in the lives of most Yemenis. Most tribes in Yemen 
are populations of settled farmers, not nomadic or transhumant, 
and most of Yemen is inhabited by sedentary tribes. The areas 
around Ibb and Ta’izz in Lower Yemen are the only major regions 
in the country that were never organized tribally. Although they do 
share a similar political culture, tribes “vary regionally in size, 
forms of identity, and modes of organization.15 The location of the 
different tribes and their relationship to the environment they 
inhabit varies depending on whether the area is arid or fertile, 
inaccessible or along well-established routes. In addition to these 
factors, its distance from major towns and trade routes affect the 
size and organization of the tribe and its relationship with central 
powers, be they local or colonial states.16 The southern and coastal 
                                                 
13 Gasiorowski, Government and Politics, 201. 
14 Ibid., 202. 
15 Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 2. 
16 Ibid., 3. 
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areas of the country are inhabited mostly by Sunni Muslims who 
follow the Shafi’i madhab (school of Islamic law) as a result of 
Rasulid rule in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Zaydi 
Shi’a constitute little over 20 percent of the total population, and 
they live mostly in the mountainous regions of the north known as 
the Upper Yemen. They have historically been over-represented in 
the government and the armed forces. The people of the northern 
highlands are known for their especially strong tribal ties, which 
continue to function as a basis of identity, solidarity, and social 
organization more than in other areas, according to Khaled 
Fattah,17 in Yemen: 
 
Tribes…make up the central nervous system of 
politics, and tribal sheikhs are the most influential 
pressure group in the political arena. This is because, 
in the pursuit of regime survival, all the modernizing 
agents—namely state institutions, political parties 





The Zaydi Hadawi madhab, named after the founder of the first 
Zaydi state in Yemen Imam al-Hadi (d. 911 CE), is especially 
tolerant of ‘urf (customary tribal law), which, together with 
shari’ah (Islamic religious law), has always comprised “a 
composite system for solving problems and ordering relations.” In 
addition to the religious accommodation of tribal customs and law, 
cooperation between Zaydi state officials and tribal leaders has 
also been facilitated by the fact that they share, to a great extent, 
“the same cultural assumptions and values, and employ similar 
symbols and rituals of enforcement.”19 The basis of the Hadawi 
                                                 
17 Khaled Fattah has been “a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East 
Center, where his research focused on the political, economic, security, and 
cultural sectors in Yemen, and state-tribe relations in the Arab Middle East.” He 
is currently a guest lecturer at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund 
University in Sweden. “Khaled Fattah,” Carnegie Middle East Center, accessed 
March 24, 2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/experts/810. 
18 Khaled Fattah, “Yemen: A Social Intifada in a Republic of Sheikhs,” Middle 
East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011) 79-85. 





madhab, followed by the Zaydis of northern Yemen, is formed by 
the theological and legal writings of Imam al-Hadi. That “the 
spiritual leader of the Muslim community should also be supreme 
ruler (imam) of the Muslim state,” is a central tenet of Hadawi 
Zaydism. The Hadawi doctrine also “upholds the principle of 
hereditary rule,” but without requiring an automatic succession 
from father to son. Instead, the head of the Zaydi state may be 
selected, based on merit, from among the descendants of Prophet 
Muhammad through either one of his two grandsons Hasan and 
Husayn. “The ideal imam, epitomized by al-Hadi, was both a 
warrior (mujahid) and an expert legal interpreter (mujtahid), ready 
and able to wield sword as well as pen.”20 In Zaydi tradition, 
imams came to power by disseminating a written manifesto 
claiming the imamate, which had to be accepted by the prominent 
sayyids (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) and qadis 
(judges) of the community, who would legitimize the claim by 
swearing allegiance to the imam in written form. This represented 
a “profound moral, religious, and political commitment.” Each 
northern Yemeni Zaydi dawlah “was constituted by the 
superimposition of this small ruling clique onto a broad base of 
largely self-governing tribes whose leaders also solemnly pledged 
their allegiance in written pacts.” This process provided the Zaydi 
states with legitimacy at the grassroots level.21 Understanding this 
process is important in that it can help elucidate the mechanisms 
that have allowed the Houthis to gain ground in Yemen despite the 
efforts on behalf of the regime to suppress them. Today the 
Houthis participate in national dialogue with other centers of 
power in Yemen, but remain in control of their territory and refuse 
to lay down their weapons. They have publicly rejected the 
legitimacy of the transitional government because they see it as 
betraying the revolution. The name “Houthis” refers to the family 
of the founder of the movement, but they prefer to call themselves 
Ansar Allah (Supporters of God). Due to their “opposition to Islah 
and the old regime, as well as their reputation for rejecting 
corruption and transparently administering justice, they have made 
inroads into traditionally Sunni areas of Yemen.”22 
 
                                                 
20 Weir, A Tribal Order, 230. 
21 Ibid., 231. 
22 April Longley Alley, “Yemen Changes Everything…and Nothing,” Journal of 
Democracy 24, no. 4 (2013) 74-85. 
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Roots of the Houthi Rebellion 
 
In 1993, Husayn al-Houthi, a Zaydi sayyid and the son of a 
respected Zaydi scholar Badr al-Din al-Houthi, was elected to the 
Council of Deputies and served as a member of the Yemeni 
parliament until 1997. He initially enjoyed the support of president 
Saleh, who had previously allied himself also with Salafis to fight 
the YSP, but later Saleh withdrew his support and ordered the 
governor of Sa’ada to take action against Husayn al-Houthi’s 
supporters. Saleh’s crack down provoked a rebellion in the district 
which is a stronghold of the Houthi movement and part of the 
traditional homeland of the Zaydis.23 In January 2003, president 
Saleh visited Sa’ada on his way to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and while 
visiting the city’s mosque during Friday prayers, he attempted to 
give a speech but was greeted with chants of what has become the 
Houthi slogan: “God is Great. Death to America. Death to Israel. 
Curse the Jews. Victory to Islam.” More than 600 people were 
subsequently arrested as the Yemeni government cracked down on 
those chanting the slogan. Attacks on government installations in 
the region that were attributed to the Believing Youth (BY) 
organization of the Zaydis exacerbated the situation, and some 
members of the Zaydi community felt that they were being unfairly 
targeted by the government. The chanting of the Houthi slogan 
subsequently spread to other parts of northern Yemen as well. 
Husayn al-Houthi, who was the leader of the BY, was 
summoned to appear before the president but failed to comply.24 
On June 18, 2004, 604 people were arrested by Yemeni security 
forces for chanting the slogan after Friday prayers outside of the 
Grand Mosque of the capital city Sana’a. An arrest warrant was 
issued for Husayn al-Houthi, and government troops were 
dispatched to Sa’ada to capture him. Following the deaths of three 
Yemeni government soldiers in the outskirts of Sa’ada city, the 
regime launched a military campaign that included aerial 
bombardment of the region. Husayn al-Houthi sent an open letter 
to president Saleh in which he stated: “I do not work against you, I 
appreciate you and what you do tremendously, but what I do is my 
solemn national duty against the enemy of Islam and the 
community: America and Israel. I am by your side, so do not listen 
                                                 
23 Gasiorowski, Government and Politics, 216. 
24 Lucas Winter, “Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Complicated 





to hypocrites and provocateurs, and trust that I am more sincere 
and honest to you than they are.” But al-Houthi refused to turn 
himself in to the authorities. Fighting ensued between government 
forces and supporters of al-Houthi in Sa’ada City and the 
mountains of Marran in the Haydan district of the western Sa’ada 
governorate. Husayn al-Houthi was killed in September, which 
brought the fighting to a temporary halt.25 
Husayn al-Houthi was succeeded by his brother Abd al-
Malik,26 and clashes, said to have been led by Badr al-Din al-
Houthi, broke out again a few months later. According to Lucas 
Winter,27 “Government heavy-handedness had likely increased 
support for the Houthis, and their followers began carrying out 
attacks in some of Sa’ada province’s more populated areas, 
eliciting an even harsher military response.” The second round of 
the so-called Sa’ada Wars came to an end in April 2005, as the 
government claimed it had secured most of the rebel positions; but 
clashes continued until February 2006, after which the government 
released prisoners and appointed a new governor who would work 
to improve the relations between the Houthis and the regime.28 In 
2006, president Saleh was re-elected once more and 
demonstrations against the regime started in the south in 2007 – to 
which the regime responded with increasing violence.29 
New clashes with the Houthis broke out in early 2007 in 
the bloodiest round of fighting that the conflict had seen since its 
beginning, and the fighting persisted until February 2008, when a 
Qatari brokered peace agreement brought the struggle to a 
temporary halt. Both sides claimed that the other had failed to 
deliver on its promises, and the fighting resumed a few months 
later in the fifth round of the Sa’ada Wars, this time the fighting 
reached Bani Hushaysh, a mere 20 kilometers from the capital of 
Sana’a. Another inconclusive truce was declared, but in August 
2009 the fighting resumed once more in what came to be known as 
                                                 
25 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen.” 
26 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and 
Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 2010), 1. 
27 “Lucas Winter is an analyst on the Middle East for the Foreign Military 
Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, KS.” “Lucas Winter,” Small Wars 
Journal, accessed March 24, 2017, http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/lucas-
winter.  
28 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen.” 
29 Gasiorowski, Government and Politics, 203. 
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the sixth round of the war. Yet another truce was agreed to in 
February 2010, but the conflict has not subsided, and the fighting 
continues.30 Saudi Arabia also began airstrikes and ground 
operations against the Houthis in 2009, reportedly provoked by 
military actions across its southern border with Yemen.31 In a 
speech given on September 27, 2009, president Saleh stated that 
the “war against the Houthi rebels would continue until uprooting 
them even if it lasted ages.”32 As the fighting continues to escalate 
with no end in sight, despite the fact that Saleh has stepped down 
and president Hadi has been exiled to Riyadh in Saudi Arabia, the 
implications of Saleh’s proclamation and the mind frame that 
generated it are becoming painfully clear to the people of Yemen. 
The Yemeni government has portrayed the conflict in 
ideological and political terms, claiming that the Houthis are intent 
on seizing power and imposing their extreme and atavistic religio-
political program on the whole country, while the Houthis claim to 
be fighting in self-defense against oppression on the part of the 
regime. As the “Arab Spring” swept through the region in 2011, 
and protests and demonstrations erupted throughout the country, 
the regime responded with escalating violence. But when part of 
the armed forces turned against president Saleh, in addition to 
tribal forces opposed to the regime, the president agreed to step 
down on November 23, and vice president Hadi assumed the 
presidency.33 By signing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
initiative and agreeing to a series of UN-backed implementation 
mechanisms, Saleh agreed to the transfer of executive power to the 




Iran’s Role in Yemen 
 
The role of Iran in the Yemeni Civil War has been fiercely 
contested during the conflict, and assessments of Iran’s links to the 
Houthis have often been hindered by decades of enmity and 
                                                 
30 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen.” 
31 Gasiorowski, Government and Politics, 205. 
32 Winter, “Conflict in Yemen.” 
33 Gasiorowski, Government and Politics, 205. 
34 April Longley Alley, “Assessing (In)security After the Arab Spring: The Case 





distrust between Tehran and the West. Respected Canadian 
strategic analyst, Thomas Juneau argued in 2016 that the Houthis, 
despite receiving aid from Iran, “are not Iranian proxies,” and that 
“Tehran’s influence in Yemen is marginal.” According to Juneau, 
“the civil war in Yemen is driven first and foremost by local and 
political factors, and is neither an international proxy war nor a 
sectarian confrontation.”35 Although there have been reports of 
Iranian weapons being imported to Yemen since at least 2009, the 
influx of military equipment from Iran has reportedly increased 
since the Saudi-led coalition commenced operations against the 
Houthis in March of 2015. Attacks across the border into Saudi 
Arabia by the Houthis and forces loyal to Saleh also started after 
the beginning of the offensive. In a sense, Saudi warnings about a 
proxy war have become self-fulfilling prophesies, but on a much 
smaller scale than suggested.  
The sectarian dimension of the conflict has also been 
exaggerated. As Juneau points out, “Iran does not choose its 
partners on the basis of a common adherence to Shi’i Islam.” 
Rather, “it seeks to gain access to geographic areas that it can use 
as launching pads to protect its influence, to confront its main 
regional rivals, Israel and Saudi Arabia, and to oppose the regional 
US presence.”36 The accusation that the Houthis are an Iranian 
proxy was often used by Saleh when he was the president, a claim 
that has been perpetuated by the exiled president Hadi and his 
allies in Saudi Arabia. In reality, the Houthis constitute an 
indigenous socio-political movement that has its roots in the Zaydi 
heartland of north-western Yemen. The movement has also been 
able to forge alliances across sectarian lines, thus disproving the 
proposition that the conflict is essentially sectarian in nature.  
Iran may have been supporting the Houthis in some 
capacity for many years, but the war in Yemen is not a priority for 
Iran. Juneau points out that the “high levels of instability in Yemen 
imply that a major commitment of resources would be required for 
Iran to gain the ability to shape events more than marginally,” and 
it is unlikely that such commitment is forthcoming since “Iran’s 
interests in Yemen are limited.” Moreover, given Yemen’s 
immediate proximity to Saudi Arabia and Iran’s extensive 
investments elsewhere, especially in Iraq and Syria, “stronger and 
                                                 
35 Thomas Juneau, “Iran’s Policy Towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited 
Return on a Modest Investment,” International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016): 647. 
36 Ibid., 649. 
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more overt Iranian involvement would risk an uncontrolled 
escalation of tensions with Riyadh.”37 An outcome Iran can ill 
afford. Juneau’s assertion that the Houthis are independent actors, 
supported by Iran but motivated by their own objectives is in line 
with statements made by representatives of the US government. As 
the spokesperson for the National Security Council Bernadette 
Meehan told Huffington Post in April 2015, “It remains our 
assessment that Iran does not exert command and control over the 
Houthis in Yemen,” and according to another U.S. intelligence 
official, “It is wrong to think of the Houthis as a proxy force for 
Iran.” However, the U.S. Navy increased its presence in the Gulf 
of Aden and the Arabian Sea due to reports that Iranian ships 
might be carrying weapons for the Houthis.38 
The Houthi takeover of much of the country was made 
possible by their own network of alliances amongst tribal groups 
and political power brokers in Yemen, including former president 
Saleh, who aligned himself with the Houthi revolution in 2014 
despite his previous efforts to suppress them. This unlikely alliance 
with former president Saleh was brought about by common 
opposition to the Islah Party and his former ally General Ali 
Mohsen. Their network of alliances gave the Houthis the military 
power they needed to challenge the central government.  
In light of the complexities of Yemeni politics, the 
conditions that created the Houthi revolution and Iran’s 
comparatively distant role in the Yemeni Civil War, Juneau 
concludes that the conflict in Yemen “is at its root a civil war, 
driven by local competition for power, and not a regional, sectarian 
or proxy war. The Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry has superimposed 






                                                 
37 Juneau, “Iran’s Policy Towards the Houthis in Yemen,” 659. 
38 Ali Watkins, Ryan Grim, and Akbar Shahid Ahmed, “Iran Warned Houthis 
Against Yemen Takeover,” The Huffington Post, April 20, 2015, accessed 
March 24, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/20/iran-houthis-
yemen_n_7101456.html. 





Global War on Terror 
 
The rules of international politics were altered after the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on multiple targets in the United States as 
the federal government adopted security policies that were 
unprecedented and likely illegal at the time, although they were 
retroactively legalized and enshrined into United States law with 
the passing of the Patriot Act. The president at the time made it 
clear to the world that in the so-called War on Terror, there would 
be no possibility to stay neutral or unaligned as he declared that 
every person, organization, and government would either be with 
the United States, or against it.  
This ultimatum to the world presented many problems both 
morally and legally. First, it is not the responsibility of the 
President of the United States to declare war, which is an act that 
should be approved by the Congress. Second, wars have 
conventionally been declared against nation states, not tactics of 
asymmetric warfare. Even in the case of civil wars and 
insurgencies, the enemy is usually clearly defined as a faction or an 
organization that may, at least in theory, be defeated and the war 
can therefore come to a definitive end at some point in the future. 
Third, for the “leader of the free world” to issue an ultimatum to 
the whole world to render the United States, which had at this 
point become the lone superpower, its unquestioning cooperation 
in a global campaign against an ill-defined and elusive enemy, is 
not only unprecedented but morally dubious as well. Fourth, the 
intentionally ambiguous or nonexistent definitions of “terrorism” 
and “terrorist” gave the United States government practically free 
reign in choosing the targets of its global counterterrorism 
activities and provided it with a loophole that enabled it to ignore 
international law and rules of war. Many governments that jumped 
on the “War on Terror” bandwagon were quick to capitalize on this 
point and declare their own local rivals as terrorists to justify 
violent and repressive measures against political dissidents, as well 
as other potential foes.  
Furthermore, by reacting to an act of terror by rolling back 
the rights and liberties of its citizens, the United States and the 
West in general recklessly jeopardized the very aspect of western 
democratic societies that set them apart from more authoritarian 
regimes, thus not only giving the terrorists exactly what they 
wanted to achieve by their actions, but also surrendering the moral 
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high ground that stems from maintaining a free and open society. 
This has resulted in stifling of dissenting voices and creation of an 
atmosphere of fear and self-censorship. The world is seen 
increasingly in black-and-white terms within an “us-versus-them” 
paradigm that is reminiscent of the Cold War era. Unfortunately, 
16 years after the 9/11 attacks, government surveillance of its own 
citizens, indefinite detention of terror suspects, and assassinations 
that are extra-judicial or authorized by secret military courts 
continue as we supposedly fight those who hate our freedom and 
liberties, if we are to believe in the assessment of enemy motives 
made by president George W. Bush after the attacks. It is clearly a 
contradiction to defend freedom and liberty by compromising 
them, and this contradiction is not easily explained away. And 
herein lies the problem: repressive regimes the world over, 
including those of presidents Saleh and Hadi in Yemen, are taking 
advantage of the new rules of international politics to clamp down 
on their enemies domestically as well as internationally, to 
neutralize dissent and political opposition, and to move decisively 
toward an openly authoritarian model of government. These 
actions in themselves engender public resistance and compromise 
the legitimacy of the government. In the context of Yemen, these 
developments play in the hands of al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), Ansar al-Shari’ah, the southern separatist 
Hirak movement, and the Houthis as the discontented and often 
desperate masses look for alternatives to the regime that has 
become increasingly unresponsive to their needs. In many ways, 
fighting terrorism with aggressive and repressive methods only 
creates more resistance, and by stooping to new lows in their 
disregard for the well-being of their own citizens, regimes that 
resort to violence and oppression are effectively turning the tables 
against themselves – while making terrorists into martyrs and 
providing them with the false aura of freedom fighters. 
 
 
The United States Involvement in Yemen 
 
In 2000, an American guided missile destroyer USS Cole was 
bombed off the coast of Yemen, killing seventeen American 
sailors, in response to which the CIA conducted its first drone 
strike in Yemen on November 3, 2002, killing six al-Qaeda 





explosion was caused by a gas canister, the United States Deputy 
Secretary of State, Paul Wolfowitz, told CNN that the CIA strike 
in Yemen was “a very successful tactical operation,” thus 
effectively claiming the strike on behalf of the United States 
government. The Deputy Secretary-General of Yemen, General 
Yahya M. al-Mutawakel remarked in response to the statement that 
“This is why it is so difficult to make deals with the United States. 
This is why we are reluctant to work closely with them. They don’t 
consider the internal circumstances in Yemen. In security matters, 
you don’t want to alert the enemy.” Overt U.S. strikes would not 
take place in Yemen until 2010.40 
In 2008 and 2009, AQAP conducted a series of terrorist 
attacks in Yemen and declared war on the regime.41 In December 
2009, according to Amnesty International, a US cruise missile 
killed 41 civilians in al-Ma’jalah in southern Yemen in an attack 
against al-Qaeda militants, enraging tribal leaders.42 The United 
States did not take responsibility for the attack. However, as the 
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said in a statement that “I 
would refer you to the Yemeni government for any information on 
operations against al Qaeda in their country. . . . We strongly 
support actions against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and 
cooperate closely with Yemen and other countries on 
counterterrorism initiatives.”43 In January 2010, president Saleh 
told CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, according to 
diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, that the Yemenis would 
“continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours.”44 
In 2011, Ansar al-Shari’ah took control of territory in 
Abyan and Shabwa provinces,45 and on September 30, 2011, 
Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, was killed by a drone strike in 
                                                 
40 Peter L. Bergen and Jennifer Rowland, “Decade of the Drone: Analyzing CIA 
Drone Attacks, Casualties, and Policy,” in Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, 
Law, and Policy, ed. Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 25. 
41 Gasiorowski, Government and Politics, 203. 
42 Christopher Swift, “The Boundaries of War? Assessing the Impact of Drone 
Strikes in Yemen,” in Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy, ed. 
Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 78. 
43 CNN Wire Staff, “U.S. Missiles Killed Civilians in Yemen, Rights Group 
Says,” June 7, 2010, accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2010/ 
WORLD/meast/06/07/yemen.missiles/. 
44 Bergen, “Decade of the Drone,” 27. 
45 Gasiorowski, Government and Politics, 205. 
 
Yemen and the Houthi Rebellion 
42 
 
Yemen. According to William C. Banks, a professor of law at 
Syracuse University, “Yemen’s president Saleh secretly granted 
the United States permission for the mission…Two weeks later, al-
Awlaki’s sixteen-year-old son was killed unintentionally when he 
was within a strike area where a suspected Egyptian terrorist was 
hit by a JSOC-fired drone.”46 President Hadi was officially elected 
on February 21, 2012, and in April, he launched a campaign 
against Ansar al-Shari’ah recovering most of the lost territory, but 
suicide attacks in other parts of the country followed.47 Between 
March and May of 2012, according to Peter Bergen,48 “the United 
States launched an estimated thirty-one air and drone strikes in 
Yemen, as compared with just sixteen attacks in the previous two 
years.”49 In April 2012, president Obama authorized “signature 
strikes” in Yemen that were given the name Terrorist Attack 
Disruption Strikes (TADS), reportedly governed by stricter rules 
than those authorized in Pakistan the previous year, according to 
Sarah Holewinski,50 
 
these strikes are especially significant in Yemen. In 
signature strikes, attacks are not directed against 
specific individuals identified as threats to US 
national security, but rather are based on a set of 
observed actions and indicators understood to be 
significant enough to warrant lethal action. The 
United States does not disclose what behaviors 
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justify a signature strike, nor does it provide any 
guidance on this issue.51 
 
September 28, 2012, president Hadi told the UN General 
Assembly that “We invite our international partners in combating 
terrorism to provide more logistical and technical support to 
[Yemen’s] security forces and counter-terrorism units.” Two days 
later, at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, he 
acknowledged publicly that the United States was using drones 
against terrorist targets in Yemen.52 President Hadi told the 
Washington Post that “Every operation, before taking place, they 





The reluctance of the Saleh regime to admit that it cooperated with 
the United States in its War on Terror in Yemen is understandable 
as most Yemenis do not easily accept foreign intervention and 
knowledge of such cooperation is likely to generate resistance 
against the regime. The perceived and often very real anti-
Americanism that is so ubiquitous in Yemen, perhaps best 
exemplified by the Houthi slogan, does not necessarily stem from 
any profound and principled hatred toward the United States, the 
West, or democracy per se, however. It can often be a simple 
byproduct of the United States’ involvement in the region, the 
most visible dimension of which are Hellfire missiles fired from 
U.S. unmanned aircraft and other types of weapons made in the 
United States, whether used by the U.S. or its regional allies. 
Yemenis resent U.S. drone strikes for many reasons, but the most 
common reason is the fact that an outside power is seen to be 
interfering with the internal politics of the country. According to a 
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member of the Yemeni Socialist Party, “Drones remind us that we 
don’t have the ability to solve our problems by ourselves. If these 
were Yemeni drones, rather than American drones, there would be 
no issue at all.” This statement is corroborated by a member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood who, in 2012, observed that “No one resents 
a drone strike if the target was a terrorist…What we resent is the 
fact that outsiders are involved.”54 
While the counterterrorism campaign of the Obama 
administration may have been well intentioned and proportional to 
the threat posed by AQAP and similar organizations to the United 
States, it undeniably continued to inflame an already tenuous 
situation in the region and across the globe. On the local level, 
terrorist organizations thrive when there are masses of desperate 
people whose only contact with the United States has been in the 
form of fire from the sky. In fact, organizations like AQAP do not 
find much support among the local population for ideological or 
religious reasons. The main reasons for joining extreme militant 
groups are almost always material. According to a local Salafi with 
ties to AQAP, “Those who fight do so because of the [economic] 
injustice in this country…A few in the north are driven by 
ideology, but in the south it is mostly about poverty and 
corruption.”55 As April Longley Alley observes: “The organization 
is capitalizing on domestic grievances and instability for operations 
and recruitment” while “a U.S.-supported military approach to 
combating AQ is producing complications for the regime, as 




Politics in Yemen 
 
While the United States welcomes the participation of the Yemeni 
government in the Global War on Terror, its trust in the Saleh/Hadi 
regime may be misplaced. According to a former US intelligence 
official, “There were times when we were intentionally misled, 
presumably by [former president] Saleh, to get rid of people he 
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wanted to get rid of.”57 For example, in May 2010, a US aircraft 
killed a local deputy governor who was a political rival of 
president Saleh, identified as a high-value target by the Yemeni 
security forces.58 According to Nabeel Khoury,59 “Yemen's 
collaboration against terrorism was also tinged from the start with 
former president Saleh's personal agenda.” The Deputy Governor 
of Maarib, Jabir al-Shabwani, had been given the task by Yemeni 
government to negotiate with AQAP militants for their surrender 
when he was killed alongside the militants in 2009. The AQAP 
militants targeted by the strike had visited local government offices 
without being captured earlier the same day, raising the question of 
who was the intended target of the strike. In 2010 it was reported 
that “Large numbers of civilians also died during Saudi air strikes 
against Houthi rebels in late 2009, apparently because the 
Yemenites, by all appearances, had purposely provided false target 
information.”60 In another case in August of 2012, Selim Jaber, a 
religious scholar who had denounced al-Qaeda in his sermons at a 
local mosque, and his cousin Walid, were killed while meeting 
with three strangers, not known in the community, whom Yemen’s 
ministry of defense had described as AQAP militants.61 According 
to Stephen Day,62 “President Saleh likes to portray his local 
opposition as a foreign-inspired threat to national security. This is 
the regime's standard playing card … labeling political opponents 
as traitors and placing his confrontation with them in the same 
category as the U.S.-sponsored war on terrorism.”63 Another 
example of misuse of United States material support for the regime 
is the case of Hisham Bashraheel, whose family owned the daily 
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newspaper al-Ayam. Bashraheel was arrested by a U.S. trained 
Counter Terrorism Unit on charges of aiding terrorists, after having 
simply published columns that were critical of the president’s 
policies in south Yemen.64 Fortunately, the question of potentially 
erroneous tactics in the War on Terror in Yemen has been raised in 
the United States by politicians at the highest level. Regarding the 
case of AQAP leader al-Qadhi who was killed on November 7, 
2012, in a drone strike on his house, Gregory Johnsen65 reported 
that “Senator McCain asks in a committee hearing, why, given that 






The Houthi phenomenon in Yemen has its roots in popular 
resistance to the policies and corruption of the Yemeni 
government, to which the Zaydi Shi’ism of the al-Houthi family 
led movement gives a politico-religious dimension. Despite the 
religious rhetoric and the amalgamation of political and religious 
themes that drives the Houthi movement, history attests to the 
possibility of peaceful and civic incorporation of the Zaydis within 
a republican framework, provided that they are afforded some 
degree of autonomy and heard at the national level. To paint the 
Houthis with the same brush as al-Qaeda and other militant 
extremists involved in asymmetric warfare against the West would 
be a gross generalization and inaccurate in that the Houthis, like 
Zaydis in general, are not interested in a long-term battle for global 
domination but are instead locally oriented and see their struggle as 
one of self-defense and justice in a Yemeni political context. The 
attempts to portray the Houthis as terrorists by the Yemeni regime 
are, in fact, a deliberate campaign of misinformation conducted by 
the regime in order to justify increasingly oppressive and 
undemocratic domestic policies. The political elite of Yemen does 
whatever it can to hold on to power while the Yemeni society 
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disintegrates into its constituent components, which have 
historically been tribes, clans, and other kinship groups.  
The support for the regime by the Saudi led coalition and 
the United States as the sole source of stability needs to be 
reevaluated in the face of untold suffering inflicted upon the 
civilian population. The current situation in the country is simply 
untenable, and to continue to prop up a corrupt, ineffective regime 
will only result in further destruction of a nation that is already 
among the poorest in the world. The fact that the government of 
Yemen also operates chiefly on the basis of tribalism, and 
patronage is enough reason to question the degree of stability it 
will be able to provide if it were ever to overcome the deep-seated 
resistance of the population. Also, the methods employed by the 
militarily much stronger coalition backing president Hadi, and 
their humanitarian consequences must be taken into account while 
formulating foreign policies in the region. It is highly unlikely that 
devastating violence meted out on an innocent civilian population 
will increase the popularity of the United States in the region, and 
it can be argued that such actions can only create more desperation 
and hatred among the people bearing the brunt of suffering under 
the U.S. manufactured bombs. Even if those bombs are dropped by 
Saudi Arabia or other Muslim countries, the United States will be 
considered guilty by association as long as shrapnel of grenades, 
missiles, and unexploded cluster bombs are clearly “made in the 
U.S.A.” While the scorched-earth policy of the government and its 
foreign backers may be expedient in the eyes of the regime, it is 
unlikely to solve any problems in the region. According to a report 
by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for human Rights 
(OHCHR), at least 4,773 civilians have been killed and another 
8,272 have been injured in Yemen since March 26, 2015 
(including only those casualties that have been confirmed as 
civilians). In addition, approximately 21 million Yemenis 
(representing 82 percent of the population) “are in urgent need of 
humanitarian assistance.”67Continued bombing and other forms of 
military intervention are likely to produce more dead bodies, 
devastation, and ultimately, resistance. The resistance will be 
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directed at both the Hadi regime as well as its international 
supporters. Yemen burns, and the failure to re-evaluate US foreign 
policy and arms deals in the light of the reality on the ground 












































26 September Net. “Members of the Guidance Council Declare 
Their Support for the People’s Revolution” (Arabic). 
September 21, 2014. Accessed March 24, 2017. 
http://www.26sep.net/news_details.php?sid=107024. 
 
“April Longley-Alley.” International Crisis Group. Accessed 
March 24, 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/who-we-
are/people/april-longley-alley. 
 
Banks, William C. “Regulating Drones: Are Targeted Killings by 
Drones Outside Traditional Battlefields Legal?” In Drone 
Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy, Edited by 
Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015. 129-159. 
 
Bergen, Peter L. and Jennifer Rowland. “Decade of the Drone: 
Analyzing CIA Drone Attacks, Casualties, and Policy.” In 
Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy, 
Edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 12-41. 
 
Braun, Megan “Predator Effect: A Phenomenon Unique to the War 
on Terror.” In Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, 
and Policy. Edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel 
Rothenberg. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
253-284. 
 
Fattah, Khaled. “Yemen: A Social Intifada in a Republic of 
Sheikhs.” Middle East Policy 18, No. 3 (2011): 79-85. 
 
Gasiorowski, Mark, David E. Long, and Bernard Reich. 
Government and Politics of the Middle East and North 
Africa. Boulder: Westview Press, 2013. 
 
“Gregory D. Johnsen.” The Jamestown Foundation. Accessed 





Yemen and the Houthi Rebellion 
50 
 
Harb, Khalil. “Ansar Allah Vows to Defeat Al-Qaeda in Yemen.” 




Holewinski, Sarah. “Just Trust Us: The Need to Know More About 
the Civilian Impact of US Drone Strikes.” In Drone Wars: 
Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy. Edited by Peter L. 
Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015. 42-70. 
 
Juneau, Thomas “Iran’s Policy Towards the Houthis in Yemen: A 
Limited Return on a Modest Investment.” International 
Affairs 92, No. 3 (2016): 647–663. 
 
“Khaled Fattah.” Carnegie Middle East Center. Accessed March 
24, 2017. http://carnegie-mec.org/experts/810. 
 
Khoury, Nabeel A. “Yemen: In Search of a Coherent U.S. Policy.” 
Middle East Policy 21, No. 2 (2014): 100-110. 
 
Lapidus, Ira M. Islamic Societies to the Nineteenth Century: A 
Global History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012. 
 
Longley-Alley, April. “Assessing (In)security After the Arab 
Spring: The Case of Yemen.” PS-Political Science & 
Politics 46, No. 4 (2013): 721-726. 
 
———. “Yemen Changes Everything…and Nothing.” Journal of 
Democracy 24, No. 4 (2013): 74-85. 
 
———. “Yemen’s Multiple Crises.” Journal of Democracy 21, 
No. 4 (2010): 72-86. 
 
———. “Yemen’s Houthi Takeover.” Middle East Institute. 
December 22, 2014. Accessed March 24, 2017. http:// 
www.mei.edu/content/article/yemens-houthi-takeover. 
 






Miller, Greg. “Yemeni President Acknowledges Approving U.S. 
Drone Strikes.” The Washington Post. September 29, 2012. 






Mittelstaedt, Juliane von. “Operation Scorched Earth: A US Hand 
in Yemen’s Civil War.” Spiegel Online. December 3, 2010. 








“Over 100 Civilians Killed in a Month, Including Fishermen, 
Refugees, as Yemen Conflict Reaches Two-Year Mark.” 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 




“Peter Bergen.” Accessed March 24, 2017. http://peter 
bergen.com/. 
 
Salmoni, Barak A., Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells. Regime 
and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon. 
Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010. 
 




“Second Yemen Wedding Bombed as UN Says Houthi Rebels 
Accept Ceasefire.” The Guardian. October 7, 2015. 




Yemen and the Houthi Rebellion 
52 
 
“Stephen W Day.” Al-Jazeera. Accessed March 24, 2017. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/profile/stephen-w-day.html. 
 
Swift, Christopher. “The Boundaries of War? Assessing the Impact 
of Drone Strikes in Yemen,” In Drone Wars: Transforming 
Conflict, Law, and Policy. Edited by Peter L. Bergen and 
Daniel Rothenberg. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015. 71-88.  
 
“U.S. Missiles Killed Civilians in Yemen, Rights Group Says.” 




Watkins, Ali, Ryan Grim, and Akbar Shahid Ahmed. “Iran Warned 
Houthis Against Yemen Takeover.” The Huffington Post. 




Weir, Shelagh. A Tribal Order. Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2007. 
 
Winter, Lucas. “Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Complicated 
Circumstances.” Middle East Policy 18, No. 1 (2011): 102-
120. 
 
“Yemen’s Houthis ‘Pushed From Last Aden Stronghold.’” Al-



















Tomi Pulkkinen is an undergraduate student at California State 
University, San Bernardino, with two majors in Middle Eastern 
History and the Arabic language, as well as a minor in Middle 
Eastern and Islamic Studies. Tomi is a Finnish national, and has 
resided in the United States since 2010. Tomi wants to pursue a 
career in academia, and is preparing for graduate studies in the 





History in the Making 
 
 
 
 
 
